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Force Rules: UN Reform and Intervention
John C. Yoo*

As the United Nations turns sixty, it suffers from a crisis of ineffectiveness
and corruption. It failed to produce a consensus on whether the Great Powers
should have used force to enforce United Nations Security Council resolutions
regarding Iraq. It then failed to prevent the United States and a coalition of
nations from invading Iraq without the permission of the Security Council.' It
has reeled from corruption confirmed by the Volcker Commission's
investigation of UN administration of the Iraqi Oil-for-Food program.2 As
Secretary-General Kofi Annan has acknowledged, UN peacekeepers in the
Congo and other African countries have engaged in the sexual abuse of
children.3 Recalling its failures in Bosnia and Rwanda, the United Nations has
stood by while almost four hundred thousand have died in Darfur, Sudan, with
the potential for hundreds of thousands more in the near future at the hands of
government-backed militias.4
Secretary-General Kofi Annan has responded by proposing reform of the
rules governing the use of force and changes in the structure of the Security
Council. Presented in a new report, In LargerFreedom: Towards Development, Security
and Human Rights for All, Annan acknowledges that nations may use force more
broadly to confront the problems created by terrorism, rogue nations, and
human rights catastrophes, but demands that the Security Council still retain its
monopoly on the authorization of the use of force beyond that required for self-
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defense.' He proposes the enlargement of the Security Council to increase the
presence of geographic regions not currently well represented and to recognize a
shift in global power away from the countries of "Old Europe" and to nations
such as Japan, India, and Brazil.6 To address the new threats of terrorism and
rogue states, Annan also recommends that nations agree on a definition of
terrorism, which will henceforth be prohibited,' and asks for an expansion in the
UN's peacekeeping operations by creating a "strategic reserve" of national
forces that can be deployed rapidly, but only on the call of the United Nations.8
In making these suggestions, the Secretary-General primarily adopted the
December 2004 recommendations of a "High-Level Panel on Threats,
Challenges, and Change" appointed by him.9
At first glance, these reforms suggest a significant change in the way that
the United Nations views the use of force. These differences, however, are
rhetorical in nature. Indeed, they do not represent any change in the legitimacy
of the current use of force by nations, nor would they have the effect of moving
legal rules in the best direction to address the world's current problems. In fact,
the Secretary-General's proposals would likely have the opposite effect-they
will inhibit the use of force when it would promote the goals of international
peace and security. The choice for the United States is whether it has sufficient
control in the United Nations to spark new reforms in promoting international
peace and security, whether it ought to seek alternate rules to govern the use of
force, or whether it simply ought to ignore the UN and create a separate security
framework-as it did successfully during the Cold War.
This Article has three parts. Part I will discuss the existing legal framework
established by the UN Charter governing the use of force. It questions whether
this structure has succeeded in regulating state practice, and describes both the
proposed reforms and the new international environment that prompted them.
Part II criticizes the reforms' response to the rise of rogue nations and
international terrorism by emphasizing the legal doctrine of imminence and a
recentralization of power in the UN Security Council. It argues that the concept
of imminence does not make sense, and should be replaced by a cost-benefit
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analysis of expected harm. Part III addresses whether the reforms successfully
grapple with contemporary international problems from the perspective of
global welfare analysis. It argues that enforcing peace and security by eliminating
rogue nations, pursuing terrorists, or ending human rights disasters supplies an
international public good, and that UN reforms will suppress, rather than
increase, the amount of needed intervention. Perversely, the UN reforms will
have the effect of retarding international cooperation to solve the very problems
they seek to prevent.
I.
The UN Charter creates an almost inviolable presumption in favor of state
sovereignty and a strict rule against the use of force by nations. It does so in
three provisions. First, Article 2(4) requires member states to refrain from the
threat or use of force "against the territorial integrity or political independence
of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the
United Nations."10 Article 2(4) admits no exceptions; preventing humanitarian
disasters or rooting out terrorist organizations finds no explicit approval in the
text of the UN Charter. Second, the Charter creates a Security Council that has
the authority to order nations to use force "as may be necessary to maintain or
restore international peace and security."" Third, Article 51 reaffirms that if a
nation is attacked, it may use force to defend itself:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual
or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the
United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to
maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in
the exercise of the right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the
Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and
responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at
any time such action as it deems necessary to maintain or restore
12
international peace and security.
Taken together, these three provisions promote what I have called
elsewhere a law enforcement paradigm toward the use of force. 3 Like the
domestic criminal justice system, the international legal system imposes an
absolute prohibition on the use of force by nations. Nations give up their right
to use force and delegate it to the UN, just as domestic government possesses a
monopoly on the legitimate use of violence. The UN, like domestic government,
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may use force to maintain peace and prevent violence between nations. Force
may be used only in self-defense, after another nation has first attacked and thus
first violated the law, just as in domestic law an individual may use deadly force
to defend against an attack.
Some have argued that the right to use force internationally is even
narrower than the right to use force in self-defense under domestic law. Several
prominent legal scholars believe that Article 51's condition on the right to use
force only "if an armed attack occurs" limits self-defense to only after an enemy
attack crosses a border or otherwise begins. 14 They argue that such a strict rule is
necessary to prevent pretextual claims of self-defense or international instability
produced by the use of force between nations."5 Critics of this reading argue that
Article 51 codified the right of self-defense as it existed under customary
international law at the time of the Charter's adoption, but did not extinguish it,
a view shared by the International Court of Justice in the Nicaragua case. 6 Under
this view, pre-Charter customary international law had permitted nations to use
force in anticipation of an attack that had not yet occurred-so long as the
attack was imminent. Most authorities trace the imminence test back to the
Caroline incident,7 in which the United States and Great Britain agreed that a
pre-emptive attack was justified if the "necessity of self-defense [was] instant,
overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation."' 8
While the Charter's rule remains strict, it does not appear to have
succeeded in its goals of preventing war. From 1945 to 1997, according to the
Correlates of War project, twenty-three interstate wars have occurred.' 9 Another
study records thirty-eight interstate wars from 1945 through 1995, which would
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increase to at least forty-one in 2003 with the addition of the wars in Kosovo,
Afghanistan, and Iraq. 20 Only two-the Korean War in 1950 and the first
Persian Gulf War in 1991-received the authorization of the UN Security
Council. Mark Weisburd counts more than one hundred uses of force between
nations, many falling short of what the Correlates of War project would define
as a "war."'" Certainly the UN Charter's rules have not eliminated interstate war.
But has the UN Charter at least helped to reduce war? In absolute
numbers, it does not appear so. According to the Correlates of War database,
from 1816 to 1945, fifty-six interstate wars occurred, a rate of 0.43 per year.
From 1945 to 1997, that rate is 0.44 per year. A different study found that from
1715 to 1814 there were thirty-six interstate wars, from 1815 to 1914 there were
twenty-nine wars, from 1918 to 1941 there were twenty-five interstate wars, and
then from 1945 to 1995 there were thirty-eight wars.2 2 According to these
figures, the rate of interstate wars either roughly remained the same or increased
during the period of the UN Charter and the League of Nations. When
corrected for the number of states, however, the frequency of interstate war
seems to have dropped during the UN Charter period. From 1715 to 1814, the
number of interstate wars per year per state was 0.019; from 1815 to 1914, it was
0.014; from 1918 to 1941 it was 0.036; and from 1945 to 1995 it was 0.005.23
These figures suggest that the nature of armed conflict appears to have
shifted since the end of World War II. First, it appears that the great majority of
casualties suffered since World War II have arisen in intrastate, rather than
interstate, wars. In World War I, the number of deaths was approximately
thirteen to fifteen million; in World War II, approximately fifty to sixty million;
in the conflicts since World War II, about forty million. 24 Of all of the armed
conflicts since World War II, roughly 75 to 80 percent have occurred within a
state, and approximately 80 percent of overall casualties during this period have
resulted from such wars.25 Second, conflicts during the post World War II
period have become more localized. Since the end of World War II, there have
been no global, multi-state conflicts, no Great Power conflicts, and no wars in
Western Europe or North America. Third, conflicts seem to have lost their
territorial focus. Most wars occur within a state, not between states, and do not
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seem to be fought for territorial gain, with some notable exceptions such as the
Iran-Iraq war and the first Persian Gulf War.26
At the outset, this data suggests that the rules of the UN Charter no longer
fit the world we face today. On the one hand, the Charter's rules were literally
designed to fight the last war-the global, multi-state, mechanized wars that had
killed so many in World Wars I and II. The international system, however, has
enjoyed a long period of freedom from the scourge of massive interstate
warfare, such that the leading historian of American foreign relations during the
Cold War has called the 1945 to 1991 period "the Long Peace. ' 27 On the other
hand, the Charter's drafters did not anticipate that the challenges to international
peace would arise not from interstate wars, but from intrastate conflicts rooted
in civil wars or the collapse of government institutions. The UN Charter's strict
rules against intervention except in self-defense renders any outside effort to
stop civil wars or prevent humanitarian disasters illegal without the permission
of the Security Council.
A defender of the UN system could argue that the UN Charter has
produced the post-1945 period of international peace and stability. This seems
to be the view of the United Nations High-Level Panel on Reform, which argues
that "the United Nations helped to reduce the threat of inter-State conflicts
through the Secretary-General's 'good offices,' or quiet diplomacy aimed at
defusing crises and providing hostile parties the opportunity to talk freely and
test intentions. ' ' 28 This argument, however, confuses correlation with causation.
As far as I can tell, there are no empirical studies that show that the UN Charter
has caused any reduction in interstate warfare. In fact, leading diplomatic history
and international relations scholars attribute the period of relative peace and
stability in the post-World War II period to the bipolar balance of power
between the United States and the Soviet Union and their possession of large
nuclear arsenals, which encouraged them to avoid conflict. 29 Even the UN HighLevel Panel recognizes this in its report, with the observation that "for the first
44 years of the United Nations, Member States often violated [the Charter] rules
and used military force literally hundreds of times, with a paralyzed Security
few Chapter VII resolutions and Article 51 rarely providing
Council passing' 3very
0
credible cover.
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Not only do the UN Charter's rules on the use of force fail to respond to
the change in the phenomenon of armed conflict, they also do not account for
political and technological developments. As the September 11, 2001 attacks
demonstrated, non-state actors have emerged, able to wage armed conflict with a
power that only nation-states once possessed. Yet, international terrorist
organizations, by their very methods of operation, may render the self-defense
rules obsolete. Terrorists deliberately disguise themselves as civilians, have no
territory or populations to defend, and attack by surprise. This makes it virtually
impossible to use force in self-defense once an attack is in motion, and provides
no target to threaten in retaliation. Rogue states may share the undeterrable
character of terrorist organizations, because they have removed themselves from
the international system and their leaders may have little regard for attacks on
their territories or populations. Marrying these political developments with the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction ("WMD") technology has even
further undermined the rules on the use of force. If nations or groups can
launch a sudden attack with weapons of devastating magnitude, the time to
respond, along with the effectiveness of nonviolent measures are reduced. This
urges the use of pre-emptive action to prevent a WMD attack.
Secretary-General Annan and his High-Level Panel on UN Reform nod to
these developments, but propose no serious measures to allow the United
Nations to respond in a meaningful way. To his credit, Annan recognizes that
dispute over the rules governing the use of force has divided the United
Nations. Nations
have disagreed about whether States have the right to use military force preemptively, to defend themselves against imminent threats; whether they
have the right to use it preventively to defend themselves against latent or
non-imminent threats; and whether they have the right--or perhaps the
obligation-to use it protectively31 to rescue the citizens of other States from
genocide or comparable crimes.
In other words, the Secretary-General classifies the use of force into three
types, in addition to pure self-defense from an attack: (i) pre-emption, which he
defines as a response to an imminent attack; (ii) prevention, which he defines as
a response to a latent but not yet imminent attack; and (iii) protection, which he
defines as force used to stop genocide or other humanitarian disasters.
In one good sign, the Secretary-General argues in favor of interpreting
Article 51 to permit the use of force in self-defense to address imminent attacks.
According to Annan, "imminent threats are fully covered by Article 51, which
safeguards the inherent right of sovereign States to defend themselves against
armed attack. Lawyers have long recognized that this covers an imminent attack
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as well as one that has already happened. ' 3 2 This puts the United Nations on the
side with the bulk of scholarly opinion that Article 51 permits the use of force in
anticipatory self-defense. But it does not represent a great change in the law, as
the Caroline doctrine had already established the imminence doctrine.
Unfortunately, in regard to the second and third types of the use of
force-prevention and protection-the reports of the Secretary-General and the
High-Level Panel are long on rhetoric but short on practical reform. With regard
to both, the Secretary-General recognizes that the use of force may constitute an
effective remedy for the spread of WMD to hostile hands or to humanitarian
crises, but he still restricts the authority to use force to only the Security Council:
Where threats are not imminent but latent, the Charter gives full authority
to the Security Council to use military force, including preventively, to
preserve international peace and security. As to genocide, ethnic cleansing
and other such crimes against humanity, are they not also threats to
international peace and security, against which humanity should be able to
33
look to the Security Council for protection?
The High-Level Panel similarly chose to restrict the right to use force for
prevention to only the Security Council. According to its report, "if there are
good arguments for preventive military action, with good evidence to support
them, they should be put to the Security Council, which can authorize such
action if it chooses to. If it does not so choose, there will be, by definition, time
to pursue other strategies., 34 In terms of humanitarian crises, the High-Level
Panel further explained that the Security Council should stay firm in the
understanding that it can use its Chapter VII powers to authorize collective
military action, so long as it finds that the situation rises to the level of a threat
35
to international peace and security.
Rather than loosen the restrictions on the use of force, both Annan and
the High-Level Panel provide new criteria to guide the considerations of the
Security Council. According to Annan, the Security Council "should come to a
common view on how to weigh the seriousness of the threat; the proper
purpose of the proposed military action; whether means short of the use of
force might plausibly succeed in stopping the threat; whether the military option
is proportional to the threat at hand; and whether there is a reasonable chance of
success."36 The High-Level Panel provided more explanation for the articulation
of standards. The panel believed the problem was an absence of agreement on
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the Security Council about humanitarian intervention, and a lack of trust by nonSecurity Council members in the Council's decisions. By adopting these criteria,
the panel sought "to maximize the possibility of achieving Security Council
consensus around when it is appropriate or not to use coercive action, including
armed force; to maximize international support for whatever the Security
to minimize the possibility of Member States bypassing the
Council decides; and
37
Council."
Security
II.
The reforms proposed by the Secretary-General and the High-Level Panel
fail to address the actual challenges to international peace and security. Arguably,
their proposals do not work any real change in existing doctrine on the use of
force. For example, they recognize that the right to self-defense is not limited to
cases involving a cross-border attack actually in progress, as some academics had
thought; but the imminence rule was one that state practice had recognized even
before the Charter. Requiring that states receive the approval of the Security
Council for all other uses of force maintains the current system, which already
prohibits all use of force except those in self-defense or approved by the
Council. By continuing to tie the legitimate use of force to an imminent attack,
the United Nations will remain trapped in an outmoded framework that does
not take account of the realities of terrorism, rogue nations, or WMDs.
This Part criticizes the reforms' emphasis on imminence as the line
between legitimate and illegitimate uses of force. Imminence depends on timing;
only when an attack is just about to occur can a nation use force in its selfdefense. Imminence, however, does not take into account the magnitude of
harm posed by a threatened attack. According to conventional doctrine, a nation
must wait until an attack is imminent before using force, whether the attack
comes as a small band of cross-border rebels, as in The Caroline,38 a rogue nation
wielding nuclear missiles, or a terrorist organization armed with biological or
chemical weapons. Imminence also fails to recognize the windows of
opportunity that could allow a nation to use force against an enemy, such as a
terrorist operative, who comes into clear view at a time when his attack is not
temporally imminent, but who could then disappear or disguise his future attack
within a civilian population. Finally, the imminence doctrine cannot address
cases in which an attack seems certain, even if temporally far off.
Rather than imminence, we should understand the use of force in selfdefense as a question of expected harm. Expected harm can be measured by
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multiplying the probability of an attack against the estimated magnitude of harm.
Imminence under the Caroline test is better understood as a measure of
probability, rather than of timing. An imminent attack is simply one that is close
to 100 percent certain. Temporal imminence fails to account for the magnitude
of potential harm. At the time of the Caroline decision in the early nineteenth
century, the main weapons of war remained the sailing ship, horse cavalry and
horse-drawn artillery, and infantry which marched on foot armed with singleshot weapons. There was a technological limit on the destructiveness of armed
conflict.
In an age of modern weapons, however, temporal imminence does not
fully capture the probability of an attack. Missile technology may allow an enemy
to attack suddenly, and WIMD knowledge could boost the destructiveness of
those attacks well beyond anything possible before 1945, not to mention the
time of the Caroline. In other words, modern technology may allow enemies to
launch attacks so quickly that there is no real opportunity to use preemptive
force to stop them. Adopting a probability-based approach, however, should
allow for more finely-tuned judgments. Nations could use force preemptively
when the probability of a hostile attack appears high, even if the timing of the
attack is still uncertain. A probability-based approach also directly affects
nations' ability to present an armed response to terrorist groups. A terrorist
attack may prove extremely difficult to detect, because a terrorist organization
does not go through the broad mobilization and deployment of regular armed
forces that usually signal an imminent attack. A nation might identify terrorist
operatives when an attack is not temporally imminent. It may have assets nearby
that could carry out a preemptive strike, and it cannot be sure that it will be able
to locate the terrorists again when their attack is in fact imminent. A nation will
have a limited window of opportunity to use force at a time when the probability
of the future attack will be lower, but without any assurance it will have the
chance to attack at that future moment. A temporally-based imminence test
would prevent a country from taking advantage of an opportunity to escape
wide-spread casualties and destruction.
Self-defense should also take into account the magnitude of harm. Nuclear
weapons and other WMDs have increased the potential harm from an attack.
WMVDs threaten profound, long-term damage to large segments of the civilian
population and environment. As the International Court of Justice recognized in
its 1996 advisory opinion on the legality of nuclear weapons, such weapons
possess unique characteristics, "in particular their destructive capacity, their
capacity to cause untold human suffering, and their ability to cause damage to
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generations to come."39 Missile technology means that nations can launch
WMDs with very little warning, making the possibility of a pre-emptive strike
within a window of temporal "imminence" extremely difficult, if not impossible.
If North Korea, for example, were to have the capability to launch an
intercontinental ballistic missile with a nuclear warhead with only fifteen minutes
warning, American military forces may very well prove unable to destroy the
missiles before they left the ground. \X'MIDs can also be delivered in
unsophisticated ways-a suicide bomber could detonate a "dirty bomb" using a
truck or spread a biological agent with a small airplane. Unconventional delivery
of WVIDs by terrorists or rogue nations makes it even more difficult, if not
impossible, to prevent an imminent attack with military force. As military
technology has changed, our test for the use of preemptive force should evolve
beyond a test based in temporally-based imminence to one that takes into
account the lethality of modern weapon systems.4 °
An additional benefit of an expected harm approach is that it answers the
difficult question of proportionality. International law requires that the use of
force be proportional but it has never provided a satisfying means of
determining proportionality. An expected harm approach would calculate
proportionality by determining the expected harm-the magnitude of an attack
multiplied by its probability. If a nation can use force that can forestall the attack
at a lower cost than the expected harm, then the use of force would be
proportional. Understanding anticipatory self-defense in this manner indicates
that a nation could use force earlier, even when an attack is less probable, so
long as it uses lower levels of force that are in proportion to the expected harm.
Brief examples from the Cold War may help illustrate this approach.
During the Cuban Missile Crisis, the United States was confronted with a covert
Soviet effort to base intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Cuba. Before the
missiles were functional, President John F. Kennedy ordered a naval blockade of
the island to prevent any further shipments of Soviet military equipment. While
President Kennedy did not authorize a more direct use of force, such as a
preemptive aerial attack or even an invasion, a naval blockade has long
39
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constituted an act of war and can itself require the use of force. Nonetheless, no
attack on the United States by the missiles in Cuba was imminent, and President
Kennedy could not claim otherwise. Rather, the United States intervened to
prevent a dramatic change in the strategic status quo which would have placed
most of the United States within the range of Soviet nuclear weapons for the
first time. President Kennedy's response makes sense legally only if it is
understood as a restrained use of force that was proportional to the probability
of a Soviet attack, taking into account the magnitude of potential harm from
nuclear weapons. Other American uses of force during the Cold War do not
make sense unless understood in this light. President Ronald Reagan's order of
precision aerial attacks on Libya in 1986 did not arise from any imminent threat
of future Libyan attacks, but instead-due to Libya's covert support of terrorism
against United States military personnel in Berlin-can be understood as limited
uses of force in proportion to the threat of future Libyan-sponsored terrorist
attacks. President George H.W. Bush's invasion of Panama did not preempt any
threat of attack on the United States, but instead removed a dictator who had
destabilized the canal area.
The United Nation's proposed reforms of the use of force rules make little
sense against this backdrop. If the use of force is to be judged against the
expected harm of an attack, as measured by probability and magnitude of harm,
then the timing of the actual attack should not make any important difference in
receiving Security Council approval. If North Korea gains the capability to
launch nuclear missiles with little warning, and hence imminence does not
provide a nation with any space for a preemptive attack, then why should a
nation under threat have to go to the Security Council for permission? The
timing makes no difference in estimating the probability of attack. This is further
underscored by the challenges of terrorism. Because of their covert, surprise
nature, terrorist attacks often present little windows of opportunity that fall
within temporal imminence. Again, why should a temporal line dictate when a
nation must go to the Security Council to preempt a terrorist attack?
One response is offered by the Secretary-General's High-Level Panel,
which favors maintaining the imminence standard. According to its report, "in a
world full of perceived potential threats, the risk to the global order and the
norm of non-intervention on which it continues to be based is simply too great
for the legality of unilateral preventive action, as distinct from collectively
endorsed action, to be accepted."' This argument is common; it essentially
claims that if the rules on the use of force are loosened, nations will claim selfdefense pretextually as a justification for illegal interventions, and ultimately the
rules will lose any binding effect at all. As the High-Level Panel declares,
41
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"Allowing one to so act is to allow all.' ' 42 There are several problems with this
critique. First, it assumes that there is a causal relationship between the relative
peace and stability between the Great Powers over the last six decades and the
strict rules on the use of force. There is no empirical study that shows this to be
true, and, as observed earlier, many of the leading scholars believe that the
bipolar balance of power between the nuclear-armed United States and the
Soviet Union produced global order. Second, it assumes that relaxing the rule on
the use of force will lead to a world without any legal rules at all. It may be the
case that legal rules have no effect on any nation's decision to use force, as
Michael Glennon argues,43 in which case none of these arguments matter. But if
legal rules do make a difference, there is no evidence that would support the
conclusion that relaxing the rule on self-defense would encourage more warfare
in undesirable places and ways. In fact, as will be explained in Part II1, there is
reason to believe that modifying the rules on the use of force will produce more
desirable interventions.
Third, the conventional view against changing the use of force rules
assumes that ex ante rules will be more effective than ex post rules. Under either
set of rules, it is possible that preemptive attacks will occur against nations that
had no true hostile intentions or abilities-in other words, a mistake is madeor that pretextual invasions will occur. The current UN Charter system follows
the form of a rule that is designed to reduce the discretion of nations in the
future to use force and requires less decision costs and information to
implement. It is enforced by the requirement of ex ante permission from the
Security Council. A different approach to legal rules is possible. Instead of a rule,
use of force could be configured as a standard. Standards allow for the balancing
of different relevant factors, but require more information and expend more
costs in decision-making. Rules generally create more ex ante legal certainty, but
at the expense of higher error rates, because the rules are not shaped to the exact
context of a particular case. Standards increase legal uncertainty, but because
they delegate authority to ex post decision-makers, generally reduce error costs.
It would seem that the use of force is better governed by a standard than by a
rule. The stakes in this area are so high, and the individual cases often unique,
that it is difficult to conclude that use of force situations have a certain similarity
and regularity which make them opportune for governance by inflexible ex ante
rules. Rather, nations could judge the use of force through consideration of
more information ex post, which should lead to less errors. If nations disagree
with a pretextual use of force, they can take counteractions, including the use of
42
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force or withholding cooperation in the post-conflict situation. If nations believe
a use of force was in error, they can place pressure on the attacking nation to
provide remedies. Defenders of the UN Charter system have failed to show why
the use of force is more appropriately governed by an ex ante rule than an ex
post standard.
III.
Proposed reforms of the use of force rules bear a second signal defect in
addition to their mistaken reliance on the imminence standard. They fail to
recognize that the international system has changed and with it the means for
protecting international peace and security. The UN Charter system was
designed to prevent large interstate wars and established a criminal justice
approach to the use of force that sought to drive international armed conflict to
zero, much in the way domestic criminal law attempts to eliminate all killing.
The primary threats to international peace and security, however, do not come
from the Great Power wars of the first half of the twentieth century, but instead
derive from the combination of rogue states, terrorist organizations, and
humanitarian disasters. Reconceiving the rules on the use of force to address a
collective action problem, rather than to enforce individualized notions of
liability, will lead to a more effective framework.
Unlike the domestic criminal justice system, it is not obvious that the
international legal system ought to seek as its goal the reduction of the use of
force to zero. Historically, states have used force in ways that have produced
global benefits, such as ending the slave trade. There may be certain types of
regimes whose spread harms not just the United States, but international stability
or global welfare. Fascism serves as an instance in which the use of force
removed a regime devoted to coercive expansion and the systematic violation of
human rights. Global welfare may have increased when the West contained the
spread of totalitarian communism to new countries. A combination of the
preceding two characteristics-systematic human rights abuses and dangerous
ideologies-define "rogue" nations such as North Korea and the former regime
of Saddam Hussein in Iraq.
Intervention may also be desirable in states where centralized authority has
collapsed, or where it has been hijacked by violent non-state actors. Failed states
allow for human rights catastrophes and may provide international terrorist
organizations safe haven. Without an effective central government, these states
cannot respond to demands from others that they apprehend terrorists or stop
harmful activities within their borders. A terrorist network may project power
into multiple nations, which may in turn destabilize the governments and
societies of those nations. The international system may benefit from the use of
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force by eliminating a base that supports destabilizing terrorist attacks in nearby
nations.
Intervening to stop a massive human rights catastrophe would constitute
another example where the use of force could provide benefits that outweigh the
costs. The post-World War II period contains many examples of government
repression, the collapse of state authority, or religious and ethnic fighting. The
Security Council has responded by finding some humanitarian crises to be a
threat to international peace and security, which allowed it to authorize the use
of force in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and East Timor.
Rather than applying use of force rules that arise from the criminal law, we
would better understand rogue nations, terrorism, and human rights violations
as collective action problems. In the study of the domestic legal system, markets
allow the uncoordinated actions of self-interested actors to reach the optimal
production of goods and services. Market failure, however, will result in the
undersupply of public goods which create positive externalities that are not fully
captured by the producer." Public goods have two salient characteristics: they
are non-rivalrous and non-exclusive; consumption of a public good does not
leave less for others, and it is not feasible to prevent people from consuming the
good without paying. As a result, private firms will not supply the good or
service at the optimal rate, because they do not internalize all of its benefits.45 In
the domestic arena, classic examples of public goods include clean air and
national defense, which benefit all members of a community, regardless of
whether they pay for them. Government action also can provide a public good
by suppressing activity that produces negative externalities, such as pollution or
overuse of commons.
International affairs have their own share of collective action problems.
Market failure at the international level can lead to an undersupply of financial
stability, environmental pollution controls, health, biodiversity, and trade.46 But
perhaps preceding all of these, as perhaps the most important international
public good, must come international peace and security. Just as domestic law
and order ensures the necessary stability for civil society and government to
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address other collective action problems, so too international peace and security
establishes the foundation to solve international health, environment, and
financial problems. Peace and stability are international public goods because
they are non-exclusive, non-rivalrous, and benefit all nations by reducing the
need for defense expenditures and allowing trade to occur. If a nation or alliance
maintains international peace, all nations benefit even if they do not contribute
47
to the costs.

If international peace and security are public goods, then we should expect
that nations rationally pursuing their self-interest will undersupply them. Nations
will use force up to the point where the costs equal the benefits that they capture
from the intervention. But the optimal point for the use of force would occur
where the costs equaled the benefits for the international system as a whole,
rather than just the benefits to the intervening nations. International legal rules
on the use of force, therefore, ought to encourage nations to use force in
situations involving rogue nations, terrorism, or human rights disasters, rather
than seek to lower the level of international armed conflict to zero.
International legal rules currently suppress the supply of intervention
below the already sub-optimal level predicted by public choice theory. As noted
earlier, the UN Charter makes the political independence and territorial
sovereignty of nation-states inviolable. For decades, many believed that
humanitarian intervention transgressed the UN Charter, regardless of whether
the Security Council approved the use of force. Even though the Security
Council has approved interventions to stop human rights abuses in Haiti,
Somalia, and Kosovo, it failed to approve the use of force in time to stop the
horrible catastrophes in Rwanda and Bosnia, and is now allowing genocide to
occur in Sudan without taking action. It similarly failed before September 11,
2001 to authorize the use of force to pursue the al Qaeda terrorist network in
Afghanistan and has not taken action to stop the acquisition of WMDs by rogue
nations such as Iraq and North Korea.
The proposed UN reforms will only exacerbate the UN's failure to act to
solve collective action problems. While the Secretary-General calls on nations to
recognize a right to protect, which could bear some similarities to an
international public good, he fails to initiate any institutional reforms that could
make the use of force easier to authorize. In fact, Annan's report recommends
expanding the size of the Security Council, either by adding to the number of
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permanent members (but not expanding the veto), or by adding more rotating
members. Under either proposal, the size of the Security Council will rise, which
will only increase the transaction costs of authorizing force. David Caron and
Thomas Weiss similarly express concern that increasing membership would not
improve the effectiveness or legitimacy of the Security Council.4 8 Not only will
more nations have more foreign policy interests that will make any consensus
more difficult to achieve in terms of substantive outcomes, but the sheer
increase in number of members will simply hinder the ability of the members of
the Security Council to negotiate and bargain to reach a decision. This is not to
say, of course, that the Security Council will never authorize intervention in
cases where a nation is producing negative externalities. Public choice theory,
however, predicts that the increase in the size of the membership will further
reduce the ability of the Council to reach decision.
These institutional changes would not have a negative impact if the
substantive rules themselves were loosened. For example, if the UN reforms
permitted nations to use force without Security Council permission when state
authority has collapsed or when a human rights disaster has occurred, then the
international legal system still might encourage nations to provide more
intervention than it currently does. One could even argue that the current system
is more desirable than the reforms. Under the current system, as it works in
practice, nations have engaged in humanitarian intervention without the
approval of the Security Council. The most notable examples are India's
intervention in Bangladesh, Vietnam's intervention in Cambodia, Tanzania's
intervention in Uganda, and NATO's intervention in Kosovo. However, the
Security Council did not authorize the use of force at any time between the
Korean War and the first Persian Gulf War. One could argue that the
international legal system was developing a norm in which nations could use
force to prevent chaos in failed states or to stop humanitarian disasters without
Security Council approval. Such actions are then judged ex post in the form of
other nations' decisions to recognize the results of the intervention or to assist in
bearing the cost. Nations, in effect, were developing a way around the literal
restrictions of the UN Charter in order to address collective action problems.
This positive development could be brought to a halt by UN reform. The
reports of the Secretary-General and the High-Level Panel go to great lengths to
clarify that the UN Charter does not permit any intervention, short of selfdefense from an imminent attack, without Security Council approval. This
proposal would prevent nations from developing a new norm of international
48
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law that, through the practice of the last few decades, has moved toward
permitting intervention in discrete situations involving failed states and human
right disasters. It would also impose an unwieldy institutional process, made
even more difficult by expansion of the Security Council, upon decisions that
pose severe collective action problems.
The question of rogue nations such as Iraq may prove to be a test case for
the effectiveness of these different approaches to the use of force. Many
scholars have focused on the threat that the United States' invasion of Iraq
posed to the Security Council. Glennon argues that the Security Council's
unwillingness to support the Iraq invasion demonstrated its inability to adapt to
the "unipolar world" of American hegemony. 49 According to Glennon, "[p]ower
disparities ... and differing views on the use of force" between the United States
and its fellow UN members have led to the Security Council's collapse."0 He
does not foresee a multilateral institutional framework determining the use of
force in the future.51 Thomas Weiss asserts that the central concern for the
Security Council is "whether it can engage the United States, modulate its
exercise of power, and discipline its impulses. 5 2 If the Security Council
continues to disagree frequently with US foreign policy on central issues, it could
end up "resembl[ing] its defunct predecessor, the League of Nations. '' s In
contrast, Thomas Franck and Anne-Marie Slaughter share a more supportive
view of the United Nations. Franck emphasizes the necessity of maintaining the
power of the United Nations' "jurying function" to restrain the United States'
exercise of its option to use force.54 Slaughter insists that the United States will
need the United Nations "more than ever in the aftermath of war-to provide
for refugees, to monitor human rights violations, 55 above all to establish a
transitional administration with genuine legitimacy[.]i
The fate of the Security Council depends largely on the lessons learned
from the use of force in Iraq. According to the Bush administration, Iraq posed
a threat to international peace and security, based on information that existed
before the 2003 invasion. There can be little doubt that Iraq had been a
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destabilizing force in the Middle East. It pursued the acquisition of nuclear
weapons, invaded Iran and Kuwait, and attacked Israel during the Gulf War. It
supported terrorist groups and used chemical weapons against its own people.
The United States and its allies spent billions annually after the Gulf War to
contain Iraq-a good measure of the significant costs imposed by Iraq on the
international system.
According to the Secretary-General and the High-Level Panel, the legality
of the war on Iraq ought to turn on whether the United States and its allies were
under imminent threat of attack by Iraq. If an attack were imminent, then the
United States could take preemptive action; if no attack were imminent, then the
use of force was preventative and required Security Council approval. Without a
claim of self-defense, the war in Iraq was illegal without the Security Council's ex
ante approval. That approval was unlikely, not just because of the difficulties of
determining whether the benefits of intervention outweighed the cost, but also
because of the collective action problem of forging a consensus among
numerous Security Council members, several of whom had their own strategic
interests in maintaining the status quo in Iraq. Yet the Security Council's refusal
to grant authorization to use force in the lead-up to the war did not stop the
United States and its allies from invading Iraq and engaging in regime change,
just as the absence of Security Council approval did not prevent the uses of
force that occurred during the Cold War period.
Contrast this result with the international public goods approach suggested
here. If the United States and its allies can capture many of the gains from
intervention in Iraq, and those benefits outweigh the costs of the intervention,
then they will use force. If the ex ante estimates turn out to be incorrect, or if
there are substantial gains to the international system that would allow the
overall benefits to outweigh the costs borne by the intervening nations, the
United States and its allies could seek assistance and contributions after the
invasion. Conversely, other nations would already have an incentive to free-ride,
so they would likely be unwilling to contribute except in particularly clear cases
where the intervention promoted an international public good. Thus, if other
nations disagreed with the invasion of Iraq, they could refuse to provide ex post
military or financial support to the US-led coalition. Failure by the intervening
nations to receive support will lead them to be more reluctant to bear the
concentrated costs of intervention in the future. At the current time, we can see
this process at work as the United States attempts to maintain its coalition and
to receive new support for the reconstruction of Iraq.
To be sure, loosening the rules on the use of force expands the possibilities
for pretextual uses of force. There are several reasons to believe, however, that
an ex post approach to policing undesirable uses of force will prove superior to
the current ex ante system. First, since the end of World War II, the costs of war
have risen and the benefits seem to have fallen. Before World War II, claims of
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self-defense or humanitarian assistance served as pretexts for conquest. But
territorial conquest may no longer provide the benefits that it once did, perhaps
because the advent of nuclear weapons and other WMDs has made it easier for
nations to impose costs on invaders, because the costs of administering a hostile
territory have greatly increased, or because the talented labor or capital that can
make a territory valuable are more mobile. This suggests that an over-inclusive
rule that serves a prophylactic purpose-barring all uses of force out of concern
over interstate invasions of territorial conquest-is unnecessarily broad because
other circumstances will help enforce the prohibition on the use of force.
Second, invaders will usually claim a pretext; even World War II Germany
claimed that its invasions were consistent with international law. The question is
not whether a use of force rule will prevent nations from claiming pretexts, but
whether it will discourage or encourage uses of force that are desirable from a
normative viewpoint. It is difficult to see why an ex ante system ought to be
more effective across the board to an ex post approach. A strict rule designed to
eliminate pretexts makes the most sense if most cases are fairly similar and
require little decision costs. An ex post system would be more effective in
judging the legality of conduct whose legality is context-specific and depends on
the weighing of many factors. It would seem that intervention in other nations is
often, if not always, dependent on facts unique to each crisis.
CONCLUSIONS
The last decade, if not the close of the Cold War, has demonstrated that
reform of the United Nations' use of force rules is badly needed. Under existing
UN Charter rules, nations may only use force in response to armed aggression
by another nation or when authorized by the Security Council. These rules were
established when the primary threat to international peace and security arose
from large, mechanized warfare between advanced nation-states that killed
millions. Threats to international peace and security six decades later are quite
different. Rather than Great Power wars between multi-nation alliances that
span the globe, the destabilizing factors in international politics arise from rogue
nations, international terrorism, and human rights catastrophes. Current use of
force rules place a legal obstacle before attempts to use force to intervene in the
territory of individual nations to confront these new threats. Usually the United
Nations must give its blessing before regional or international powers can
intervene to end such threats to international peace and security.
Proposals from Secretary-General Annan and the High-Level Panel on UN
reform do nothing to address this problem. In fact, they exacerbate it. The
reforms suggested merely repeat the imminence standard for the use of force in
self-defense without taking into account the probability or magnitude of an
attack-this represents no change in the conventional interpretation of the use
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of force rules. While the reform proposals properly identify threats to
international peace and security as arising outside the context of Great Power
warfare, they make it even more difficult for nations to address these new
challenges. They attempt to codify a rule that gives the Security Council
complete authority over all uses of force short of national self-defense, rather
than provide flexibility for the development of new international law doctrine
through practice. They also expand the size of the Security Council, which will
only aggravate the body's collective action troubles in authorizing force.
Rather than refusing to acknowledge the dramatic changes in international
security in the post-Cold War world, reform of the UN's use of force rules
should begin by modifying the rules to produce higher levels of desirable uses of
force. If we want the international legal system to address rogue nations,
international terrorism, and WiD proliferation, we must reconceive the
imminence doctrine to take into account expected harm of an attack, rather than
strictly limit self-defense to cases where an attack is temporally imminent. If we
want to increase, rather than suppress, military intervention that will produce
positive externalities to the international system by ending rogue states, flushing
out international terrorist groups, or ending human rights disasters, we should
adopt an international public goods approach to thinking about the use of force.
The international legal system ought to promote, rather than deny, uses of force
to solve these problems. Only then will reform of the UN Charter system
account for the true challenges to international peace and security and adopt
rules designed to address them.
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